Seat at the Table or Shadow in the Room? Africa and the Artemis Accords
The Moon, Earth’s natural satellite, has long fascinated humanity, shaping myths, guiding science, and sustaining life by stabilising Earth’s tilt and tides. Since the Apollo era, human perception of the Moon has shifted from symbolic exploration to strategic utilisation. The Artemis Program, with its upcoming crewed mission around the Moon, reflects this new phase of sustained lunar presence and resource use. Yet, the Artemis Program is not the only initiative shaping the modern lunar landscape; China has made equally significant strides through its Chang’e-6 mission, conducted within the ILRS initiative, which in 2024 returned 1,935 grams of samples from the Moon’s far side, alongside breakthroughs in precision navigation within cislunar space.
Within this evolving global context, Africa’s stance in lunar governance is gaining increasing attention. The continent’s connection to lunar exploration traces back to Egyptian scientist Farouk El-Baz, who helped select Apollo landing sites, and continues today through institutions like the South African National Space Agency (SANSA), which provided critical tracking, telemetry, and command support for missions such as Intuitive Machines-2 (IM-2) lunar missions, functions essential for navigation, data transmission, and maintaining spacecraft communication. In recent years, African participation has also expanded diplomatically: Rwanda, Nigeria, Angola, and Senegal have joined the Artemis Accords, while South Africa, Egypt, Ethiopia, Kenya, and Senegal have aligned with the International Lunar Research Station (ILRS) led by China and Russia.
This dual participation raises a critical question: What is Africa’s strategic outlook within these competing lunar governance frameworks, and how can the continent balance its sovereign and developmental interests while contributing to the shaping of a fair and sustainable lunar order?
This article (first of a two-part analysis) examines Africa’s engagement with the Artemis Accords, assessing the framework’s governance architecture, analysing the strategic calculations behind African participation, and evaluating whether current involvement translates into meaningful benefits or remains largely symbolic. A companion article explores Africa’s engagement with China’s ILRS, offering a comparative perspective on how these distinct frameworks shape African opportunities and vulnerabilities in lunar governance, before concluding with broader recommendations for navigating Africa’s lunar future.
The Artemis Program and Accords: Architecture, Governance, and Implementation Challenges
Mission Architecture and International Collaboration
The Artemis Program, led by NASA and formally embedded in U.S. space policy since 2017, is the United States’ flagship initiative to return humans to the Moon, establish a sustained presence there, and lay the groundwork for eventual crewed missions to Mars. Its mission architecture brings together the Space Launch System, the Orion spacecraft, commercial Human Landing Systems, and the lunar-orbiting Gateway, which will act as a logistics, science, and transfer hub for deeper space operations. Because creating a durable foothold on the Moon requires immense financial resources, advanced technologies, and a continuous chain of surface and orbital support,from power generation and habitation to mobility systems, Artemis has been conceived as a long-term infrastructure program rather than a sequence of isolated landings.
NASA has structured Artemis as a multinational, multi-actor effort: ESA contributes key Orion and Gateway modules, JAXA provides life-support and a pressurised rover, and Canada supplies Canadarm3, while companies like SpaceX, Blue Origin, Northrop Grumman, Lockheed Martin, and Boeing deliver landers and core systems. This coalition supports a stepwise roadmap, from initial Gateway launches in 2027–2028 toward the Artemis Base Camp in the 2030s, establishing Artemis as the foundation of a sustainable, shared lunar architecture.
The Artemis Accords: Legal Framework and Governance Innovation
The Artemis Accords have supported the implementation of the Artemis Program, a foundational framework introduced by NASA in 2020. As a non-binding political instrument, the Accords establish guidelines and best practices rather than legally enforceable obligations, calling for increased operational safety, reduced uncertainty, and the promotion of the sustainable and beneficial use of space for all humankind. The Accords’ scope extends beyond the Moon to encompass Mars, comets, asteroids, Lagrangian points, and transit between celestial bodies. At their core, the Accords aim to operationalise the Outer Space Treaty’s fundamental principles, particularly the duties of due regard and consultation to avoid harmful interference, and address contemporary space activities that the 1967 Treaty could not anticipate.
Three Categories of Provisions
The Accords’ provisions fall into three categories: those that transpose existing OST principles verbatim (peaceful purposes, assistance to personnel in distress), those that refine OST obligations by adding operational detail, and those introducing entirely new concepts. Section 10 addresses space resource extraction, affirming its legality under Article II of the OST and its compatibility with commercial operations, while requiring information-sharing to enable other operators to exercise due regard. However, scholarly analysis reveals this section does not constitute “subsequent practice” under the Vienna Convention, as it lacks the clarity, specificity, and widespread agreement needed for authentic treaty interpretation, particularly regarding the term “national appropriation.”
Safety Zones: Innovation and Controversy
Section 11 introduces a major innovative concept: “safety zones.” These zones are explicitly informational rather than legal exclusion zones, designed to operationalise Article IX’s duty of due regard. Their size and scope depend on the nature of operations, ranging from large zones for explosive mining to smaller areas for surface ice collection, determined by “commonly accepted scientific and engineering principles.”
The Accords emphasise that safety zones do not prohibit entry but require advance notification and coordination, thereby preserving the principle of free access to celestial bodies. Critics initially feared these zones would function as territorial claims in violation of Article II, but Section 11(10) explicitly confirms that operating within a safety zone is permissible with proper notice. This framework may constitute “emerging subsequent practice” as a supplementary means of interpreting the OST, though its resistance from major spacefaring nations like Russia and China (legal instrument itself) prevents it from achieving the status of authentic interpretation.
Paradigm Shift in Space Governance
From a governance perspective, the Artemis Accords represent a paradigm shift in space lawmaking. Rather than the anticipatory regulation characteristic of 1960s UN treaties that attempted to govern all future activities through broad principles, the Accords embrace “adaptive governance” using a staged “building blocks” approach aligned with the Hague International Space Resources Governance Working Group.
This model is incremental and responsive, requiring signatories to engage in ongoing multilateral discussions informed by operational experience, creating feedback loops between practice and regulation. While remaining grounded in the OST, the Accords depart from traditional UN multilateral forums and instead establish bilateral agreements between NASA and individual signatories that share common principles. Critics caution that this approach could legitimise U.S. deviations from the OST, while some scholars view it as a political effort to build international agreement around America’s interpretation of resource exploitation rights and to pave the way for private commercial activity.
Budgetary Instability and Programme Sustainability
The practical implementation of these principles is complicated by ongoing instability within the Artemis Program itself.
Another concern is no stability status quo: the program has faced persistent uncertainty in schedules, budgets, and partnerships. Initially, the U.S. Fiscal Year 2026 budget proposed significant cuts, including the potential cancellation of the Orion spacecraft after Artemis III, the lunar Gateway, and related programmes, which would have directly impacted international partners contributing modules, life-support systems, and other hardware under the Artemis Accords.
In response, the “One Big Beautiful Bill Act,” signed in July 2025, restored substantial funding: USD 4.1 billion for the Artemis 4 and 5 lunar missions, USD 20 million for Orion procurement, and USD 2.6 billion for Gateway development. While these allocations provided temporary relief and allowed Artemis to continue, the funding levels and continued uncertainty remain insufficient for a stable long-term roadmap. This patchwork of shifting priorities and reactive budgeting risks is creating hesitancy among international partners, who must plan and invest years in advance to support NASA’s ambitious lunar objectives.
The African Artemis Paradox: Strategic Positioning Amid Structural Disadvantages
African Participation in the Artemis Accords: Symbolic Gesture or Strategic Partnership?
From an African perspective, four nations have joined the Artemis Accords: Rwanda and Nigeria were the first, signing in 2022 during the U.S.-Africa Space Forum; Angola followed in 2023; and Senegal, through its national space agency, in 2025. This growing participation raises a critical question: What tangible benefits do these African countries gain from signing the Artemis Accords, in the short and long term?
Analysing the official statements from these nations reveals a pattern of broad aspirations rather than specific commitments. In Rwanda’s case, beyond hosting an Atlas Space Operations antenna to contribute to lunar mission control infrastructure, the official narrative emphasises access to shared scientific knowledge and technological expertise, precisely what the Artemis Accords promise in their framework, alongside capacity-building opportunities. The same general formulations appear in statements from other African signatories.
However, the substantive question remains unanswered: are these countries going to participate concretely in the Gateway station and Artemis missions? More specifically, are African nations receiving actual payload slots on lunar missions? Is there evidence of technology transfer beyond Memoranda of Understanding? Have agreements been established to place scientific instruments or small experiments on Gateway modules, rovers, or lunar landers?
Although it may be premature to make definitive assertions, especially given that the Artemis Program remains ongoing, nothing has been publicly disclosed regarding future cooperation on Artemis missions or lunar operations involving African partners. This absence of concrete details inevitably raises the question once more: is African participation merely another instance of a political effort to build international consensus around American space policy?
Consider, by contrast, the substantive U.S.-UAE collaboration under the Artemis Accords, where the partnership centres on the UAE providing a critical Gateway airlock module and, in return, NASA committing to fly an Emirati astronaut on a future Artemis mission. This represents a clear quid pro quo with defined contributions and benefits. The disparity becomes more apparent when considering that the Artemis Accords framework requires partnership commitments precisely because NASA seeks international collaboration from states and commercial partners to make the Program sustainable and distribute costs more broadly. Yet African countries face significant challenges in dedicating the substantial financial resources required for meaningful participation, particularly given that most African nations still struggle to allocate basic budgetary funds to their nascent space programmes.
Strategic Calculations and Geopolitical Positioning
Joining the Artemis Accords represents a strategic move by African nations to strengthen bilateral ties with the United States while accruing diplomatic capital in an increasingly competitive space domain. The decision carries multiple layers of strategic consideration. Firstly, it serves as a soft power instrument, signalling to the international community that these nations are modern, innovation-oriented, and forward-thinking, cultivating prestige within global space governance forums. Secondly, it positions African signatories for early participation in what proponents envision as a future lunar resource economy, securing a nominal seat at the table before extraction frameworks become established practice. The Accords also demonstrate commitment to safe, sustainable, and transparent space activities, enhancing international reputation and diplomatic alignment with the United States and Western space powers more broadly.
However, this strategic positioning carries inherent risks. Access to NASA programmes, training opportunities, and scientific data remains contingent upon practical implementation rather than guaranteed by signature alone. The fundamental question persists: Does signing without operational capacity reduce participation to a mere symbolic gesture devoid of substance? African nations are positioning themselves for a future lunar economy, yet without corresponding domestic investment in space infrastructure, technology development, or legal frameworks governing space resource extraction, their ability to capitalise on this positioning remains questionable.
Moreover, it is well established that the premier actors involved from the outset in the Artemis Program, those contributing critical hardware, technology, and operational capabilities, will retain privileged positions and decision-making influence long after the programme’s initial objectives are attained. The strategic calculation thus hinges on whether diplomatic alignment today translates into tangible technological and economic benefits tomorrow, or whether it simply confers legitimacy upon an American-led initiative whilst African nations remain perpetual observers rather than active participants.
Contentious Provisions: African Implications
The Artemis Accords introduce two particularly controversial elements that warrant scrutiny from an African perspective: safety zones and rights to extract resources. Safety zones, as outlined in Section 11 of the Accords, permit signatories to establish protected areas around their lunar operations to prevent harmful interference. Whilst framed as informational rather than exclusionary, the practical reality raises pointed questions: could African nations establish their own safety zones, or are they positioned merely to respect zones declared by technologically advanced actors?
Given the resource and capability constraints facing African space agencies, the safety zone mechanism risks creating de facto appropriation whereby those with operational presence on the lunar surface exercise spatial control, whilst those without such presence are relegated to acknowledging and avoiding these zones. This dynamic uncomfortably mirrors terrestrial patterns of exclusion (whether subtle or otherwise) despite the Outer Space Treaty’s prohibition on national appropriation.
The question of resource extraction rights proves equally problematic. The Accords explicitly support the right to extract and utilise space resources, framing such activity as lawful under the Outer Space Treaty and compatible with commercial operations. Yet most African signatories lack domestic legislation governing space resource extraction; indeed, many are still in the process of enacting foundational space policies and regulatory frameworks. This legislative vacuum raises a troubling question: if African nations lack both the technological capability to extract resources and the legal architecture to authorise such extraction, do they genuinely benefit from these provisions, or do they simply legitimise resource extraction by other actors? The parallel to Africa’s history of terrestrial resource extraction is difficult to ignore.
For centuries, African nations have witnessed their mineral wealth extracted by foreign entities under legal frameworks that provided minimal benefit to local populations. The risk of replicating this pattern in the lunar context, wherein African signatories lend political legitimacy to a resource extraction regime from which they are functionally excluded due to capacity constraints, represents a profound strategic vulnerability. Without concrete mechanisms to ensure equitable benefit-sharing or technology transfer that enable future African participation in resource extraction, the Accords may inadvertently codify a new form of extraterrestrial resource asymmetry, with African nations serving as endorsers rather than beneficiaries.
Conclusion
Africa’s engagement with the Artemis Accords highlights a core tension between global cooperation and national space ambitions. Whilst participation offers symbolic positioning within emerging lunar governance structures, tangible benefits remain elusive for nations lacking operational capacity and substantial financial resources. The framework’s emphasis on safety zones and resource extraction rights risks codifying inequalities that mirror terrestrial resource extraction patterns, positioning African signatories as legitimisers rather than beneficiaries. Strategic considerations behind African participation, strengthening bilateral ties with the United States, accruing diplomatic capital, and securing early positioning in anticipated lunar resource frameworks must be weighed against the reality that, without corresponding domestic investment in space infrastructure and legal frameworks, the ability to capitalise on this positioning remains questionable.
The question of whether symbolic participation can yield tangible returns, however, cannot be answered by examining the Artemis framework alone. China’s International Lunar Research Station offers an alternative model of lunar cooperation with distinct governance structures, partnership mechanisms, and demonstrated outcomes for African participants. The follow-up article to this analysis examines African involvement with the ILRS, exploring how bilateral agreements with China compare to the Artemis framework in terms of concrete opportunities, capacity-building outcomes, and strategic risks. Following that assessment, broader recommendations will address how African nations can navigate between these competing frameworks, ensuring a balance between immediate developmental priorities and longer-term lunar engagement strategies.